Expertise and the Supreme Court:
What is the Problem?
Ronald J. Allen∗
Much to my delight, having actually quite enjoyed my legal
education, I have been called on by a law professor for the first time
since law school to express my understanding of an important legal
issue. Unlike days of yore when students went to class at their peril,
never knowing if that was their fateful day, I was given much advance
notice by the professor. Quite like days of yore, by contrast, this
particular professor may be the world’s leading expert in the
question posed, and thus in the grand tradition of law students I am
at risk of saying silly things that will quickly be exposed as such.
Professor Risinger has directed me to address the related questions of
how federal courts are now to “approach formulating the issue to
which reliability criteria are to be applied,” and whether “in a
fundamental way how to frame the question is as important a part of
proper evaluation of expert reliability as the criteria to be applied in
1
order to arrive at an answer.” Professor Risinger has given some
2
considerable thought to these questions, as has Professor Moreno.
Guided by them, now, too, have I, although whether as usefully as
they is surely problematic. In what follows, I first provide some
introductory perspectives on these interesting questions. I then
summarize Professors Risinger’s and Moreno’s assessments, and
conclude with my own.
Harkening back again to my days as a law student, I was once
called on by the intimidating Professor Palmer to recite concerning a
very complex case of restitution, of which I had only the vaguest
comprehension. I did know that the entire litigation, being over a
total of $15, was a colossal waste of social resources, and perhaps
∗
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thinking that by getting rid of the case I could get rid of my
immediate problem, so informed him and the class that the case
should have been dismissed on grounds of inconsequentiality.
Professor Palmer, thinking the class was about restitution rather than
social policy, asked me simply to confess to being unprepared the
next time I was when called upon, thus preserving the social
resources of the class, and went on to someone else.
I have no doubt that, in a class on the law of restitution,
Professor Palmer did the right thing. I have considerable doubt, by
contrast, that it is very useful to ask how to frame the issue to which
reliability criteria are to be applied in the context of the Supreme
Court cases, viewing the matter as internal to them. This question
arises in particular with respect to the relationship between Kumho
3
4
Tire Co. v. Carmichael and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. I
believe the import of the question is: How are we to apply the
standards of Daubert, fashioned with respect to “science” that is fairly
unproblematic in terms of its internal organization and criteria of
validation, to the enormous range of issues that inhabit the
countryside between the borders of accepted science with reasonably
rigorous methods of validation and conventional knowledge that
needs no special care and feeding? That countryside is wild and
unruly, involving all forms of knowledge and experience barely
beyond what could reasonably be expected to be known or
experienced by jurors that lack reliable means of validation akin to
normal science.
To “apply” the standards of Daubert to this vast and forbidding
landscape, as Kumho Tire directs, seems to result in a significant
mismatch between tool and task. Daubert was fashioned with normal
science in mind and invokes standard criteria of scientific validation,
such as controlled studies and the like. The very essence of the
untamed land leading from there to conventional knowledge is that
its inhabitants cannot be domesticated by such tools; otherwise there
would be no problem. So, basically, the Supreme Court has
instructed the lower courts to apply standards that simply do not
apply. Thus, Professor Risinger’s question to me: how do we go
about specifying the criteria that will satisfy Kumho Tire’s demand?
As plainly the answer does not reside in the formal relationship
between Daubert and Kumho Tire, the answer must come instead from
an analysis of the system as a whole. The real question being asked is
how expert testimony fits into the administration of justice more
3
4

526 U.S. 137 (1999).
509 U.S. 579 (1993).

2003

EXPERTISE AND THE SUPREME COURT

3

generally. The answer to that question is informed by the central
concern of the Supreme Court cases—verifiable reliability of
evidence—but it is informed by much more.
Consider briefly how much more. Reliability is itself not
anyone’s ultimate goal; it is instead instrumental to accurate
adjudication. But accurate adjudication is not the only star in the
firmament in many people’s eyes. It competes with notions of
5
fairness, and the two can be at odds. Fairness, in turn, can have
many meanings that again can be in tension, such as dignity and
autonomy, and the whole ball of fairness wax can itself be in conflict
with the goal of wealth redistribution (or an elaboration on it).
To make matters more complex still, there may be what I will
refer to as technical desiderata apart from the grand issues of fairness
and the like—matters internal to the legal system that bear upon this
question. An obvious candidate is the set of constraints on the
government in criminal cases that perhaps should impose higher
evidentiary burdens on the government than in civil cases, or more
6
generally whether civil and criminal cases pose different problems.
Others are conventional and traditional modes of proceeding, such
as, in no particular order, party control of litigation, adversarial
presentation, historic and constitutional role of juries, role and
obligations of trial judges (such as preserve resources, in addition to
facilitating fairness and accuracy). Resting somewhat uneasily beside
all this is a conception of procedural rules, including rules of
admissibility, as incentive devices to promote or discourage certain
types of behavior, and of course which behavior is to be encouraged
7
or suppressed may itself be an object of dispute. Expert testimony is
a critical component of the administration of justice that touches
directly all these issues; it is both a constituent of them and
determined by them. That is why the question Professor Risinger has
both studied and propounded to me is so critical, and at the same
time, so difficult.
I suspect it is in part the influence of the more general issue of
5

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), is a good example of the conflicts
between differing conceptions of fairness, as the aftermath of Faretta played out the
distinction between dignity and autonomy. See also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168
(1984).
6
See Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert Testimony After Daubert: The
“Prestige” Factor, 43 EMORY L.J. 867, 877 (1994); D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert
Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99,
100-02 (2000).
7
Compare, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege
and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990), with Daniel R. Fischel,
Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1998).

4

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:001

the nature of the administration of justice that causes much of the
consternation about expert testimony, and that makes what might
otherwise be quite straightforward issues contentious and complex.
Differential rules of admissibility are justifiable if tort is seen as
compensatory or wealth redistributive rather than if it is seen as
8
designed to reduce the total cost of accidents, if one views the
government skeptically or not in criminal cases, and so on. For
example, if handwriting analysis were limited to civil cases, I doubt
the academy would have gotten up in arms over its admissibility.
Instead, it is often critical testimony in criminal trials, and thus affects
the ease with which criminal convictions may be obtained. If
prosecutors proffered some of the evidence proffered by civil
plaintiffs to establish physical causation in some toxic torts, such as in
the bendictin or parlodel litigation, the academy most likely would
have been up in arms again. When the underlying issue shifts from
criminal responsibility to wealth redistribution, so, too, may one’s
view of the matter, and so on. Thus, to answer what the proper
question is concerning the admissibility of expert evidence entails a
9
prior view of the proper role of litigation.
Over the questions of the goals and purposes of the legal system,
there is much disagreement. Ideological battles over the nature of
10
the criminal process are a stable part of the legal landscape, as are
11
disagreements about the teleology of the civil justice system. I doubt
that any general, useful, and uncontroversial propositions about the
conditions of admissibility of expert testimony can be formulated
without resolutions of these disagreements, and that is a task that
exceeds my meager abilities. Here I can only note that to answer
Professor Risinger’s question fully will require resolution of the larger
issues. As I predict that resolution will not be forthcoming quickly, I
further predict that neither will a definitive resolution of Professor
Risinger’s question.
Given the intractability of a definitive resolution of the question,
it must be approached instead in light of simplifying assumptions.
The one I make here is that the litigation process is largely designed
to yield accurate results—naive realism to the max, in other words.
8
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This entails complicated, complex, and controversial matters, but I
put all that aside ex hypothesi. On the assumption, then, that the rules
governing the admissibility of expert testimony emanating from the
Supreme Court cases are designed to advance accurate adjudication,
what would they look like?
I believe that the individuals who have looked most closely at the
issue are in agreement as to one significant aspect of those rules, and,
if I read them correctly, both approve of it. Relying on explicit
13
language of the Court, both Professors Moreno and Risinger have
concluded that the Kumho Tire opinion moves district court
consideration from what they call global appraisals of reliability of
evidence to contextualized appraisals, and there is much to support
this proposition in the Court’s opinion and in the lower court
14
decisions following in its wake. Moreno and Risinger are correct at
least in part that the explicit language of the Court seems to have the
implication they identify, and for very good reason. Simply put, no
matter how well credentialed and conversant in an established field,
an expert may still testify to falsehoods. These falsehoods may involve
generalities of the substantive content of the relevant field or its
methodology, or as either applies to the particular facts of the case at
hand. Focusing attention on the field and the witness’s credentials to
the exclusion of the testimony in context risks encouraging abusive
expert testimony practices—the now legendary junk science. Thus,
the district judge must determine that the testimony is relevant to the
task at hand in a localized rather than a global fashion, where that
means that the expert is testifying on the basis of knowledge applied
to the facts in a reliable manner.

12
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I say Moreno and Risinger are right in part that these decisions
are now to be made locally rather than globally. The constraint is
that expert testimony cannot advance accurate outcomes locally
unless it rests on acceptable epistemological warrant globally. A
necessary but not sufficient condition of appropriate testimony
“locally” is reliable expertise “globally.” The testimony at trial must
rest on something, obviously, and that “something” must be true,
whether it is the accumulated experience of an individual accurately
summarized or knowledge of highly systematic disciplines. That
global reliability is not sufficient to ensure local reliability is precisely
why Kumho was decided as it was, but Kumho cannot also stand for the
proposition that global reliability is not a necessary element. Without
global reliability, one has gibberish. Thus, the logical relationships
underlying the Supreme Court’s cases require that both the global
and the local issues be resolved favorably before an expert should be
allowed to testify. As Risinger points out, astrologers may or may not
be quite reliable in their testimony, now using the term “reliable” in
its normal scientific sense of procedures reaching consistent results; it
is the lack of validity—an underlying verifiable factual basis—to
15
astrology that results in its exclusion at trial.
It appears to me that the move to the local in Kumho was driven
purely by the Supreme Court’s recognition that, no matter how well
established a field is, an expert could still testify to complete junk
unless the actual relationship between the testimony and the field is
assessed and found sufficient. Thus, I do not think that Kumho so
much changed the question emanating from Daubert as it added
another layer to it; henceforth in every case district judges must
determine that a proffered witness both possesses and is
appropriately applying an expertise, which require that there be in
fact an expertise. In fact, I would go further and say that this
addition was a perfectly predictable and plainly necessary
16
emendation on Daubert. Thus, to the extent that my assignment was
15

Professor Risinger puts this in terms of a rejection of astrologers’ “methods of
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motivated in part by the possibility that Kumho sent the expert
testimony process in a new direction from that of Daubert, the answer
to what question is to be asked of the expert post-Kumho is precisely
whatever questions should have been asked post- (and for that matter
pre-) Daubert, to-wit: Does the expert in fact possess knowledge useful
to this trial that is being brought to bear upon it in a way that
increases the probability of accurate outcomes? That Kumho dealt
with purported expertise outside of the range of conventional
17
scientific inquiry was just a happenstance from this perspective.
Before long a “normal science” case would have come along with a
well-credentialed expert willing to offer testimony that overleaped the
expert’s knowledge or data, and the Court would have disapproved of
it. The Court just simply killed two birds with the Kumho stone by
clarifying the reach of FRE 702 and that junk science cannot be
presented by real scientists or other experts willing to violate their
18
oaths.
At this level, then, the only point of interest that comes from
analyzing Professor Risinger’s assignment to address how the lower
courts are to “approach formulating the issue to which reliability
criteria are to be applied” is perhaps that the dustup over what Kumho
Tire did to Daubert was largely beside the point. Kumho Tire merely
applied Daubert in the only way (that I can see at any rate) that makes
sense, if accurate adjudication is the desideratum.
There is a second aspect to this assignment, though. Even if
there is not a “global” change from Daubert to Kumho with respect to
the conditions of admissibility of expertise, still Kumho did clarify that
FRE 702 applies in some fashion to expertise from fields that lack the
epistemological warrant of much modern science, with its controlled
examination). He wrote, “[t]his unanalyzed global approach is now clearly
unavailable after Kumho Tire.” Id. It is only unavailable as a sufficient condition of
admissibility; it is plainly necessary.
17
It was not a happenstance for the question of the scope of Daubert, of course.
18
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reliability.” Risinger, supra note 2 at 775. He does not develop further the
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Similarly, Professor Moreno at one point says: “judges must work to uncover
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studies, peer review, and the like. Can anything systematical be said
about the conditions of admissibility of the many different kinds or
forms of expert knowledge that reside in the landscape ranging from
Daubert to Kumho? Again, Professor Risinger is leading the way in this
regard. In an important article, he has sketched out a preliminary
functional taxonomy of expertise in which he usefully distinguishes
between experts who will or can educate the fact finder as to the
underlying discipline, thus putting the fact finder in a position
rationally to appraise the evidence, and what he calls “translational”
experts, which are those who will provide opinions about the
19
evidence to which fact finders can defer. He further provides an
insightful analysis of translational expertise, highlighting the various
ways in which it can go wrong, thus highlighting the hurdles that
judges should impose before admitting evidence of this sort. Perhaps
part of his assignment to me included developing further this
taxonomy.
But I demur, although not out of disrespect. Quite the opposite,
in fact, because I think he has said all there is to say about the matter,
and has given detailed, useful examples. All that remains to be done
is to apply his central point to the myriad cases of expertise that will
arise, which will happen, appropriately, in a common-law fashion
over time.
What, then, has he said? His basic point is that judges must be
convinced that an expert is testifying on the basis of knowledge
rather than caprice, superstition, or whatever, but that the basis of
that demonstration will vary over the discipline in question. Precisely
so. To translate this into my own terms, he has taken the distinction
that Joe Miller and I advanced between educating the fact finder and
providing an opinion to which it can defer and applied it to the judge
20
in its role of determining the admissibility of evidence. This is a
powerful point, and one that I wish I had thought of myself.
Professor Risinger also reaches a position analogous to the
conclusion of our previous work that the judge must, in fact, be
educated about the basis of the expert’s opinion, and conclude that it
is rational and warranted, before admitting it at trial. Again, precisely
so. I would add to it only one further step. If the trial judge is
rationally convinced that an expert is testifying on the basis of
reliable expertise, then the trial judge has been sufficiently educated
19
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in the discipline to follow and appraise the progression of the
expert’s thought. If such education is possible, then circular “general
acceptance” reasoning standing alone is not necessary and should be
insufficient, as it is the reason for general acceptance that matters.
General acceptance may be a useful confirmatory signal, but little
more than that.
Combining Professor Risinger’s insight with our previous work
on the education-deference divide leads to an unexpected
implication, however. If the trial judge must be educated about the
underlying basis of an expert’s opinion, and can follow the reasoning
process of the expert, then whatever is presented to the trial judge
can be presented to the jury if there is one. Thus, there is no need to
permit expert opinion testimony devoid of the underlying basis that
permits the opinion to be rationally processed and analyzed by the
21
fact finder. Whether a jury understands is a different matter, but it
is hardly a serious argument for not providing a jury the basis of an
expert’s testimony that possibly the jury will not understand it. Quite
the contrary, such a risk should inform what the party must present
22
to the fact finder.
There is, then, a general rule that emerges from all this, which is
that parties must educate trial judge and fact finder about the
relevant matters, just as they must with respect to everything else at
trial, and in terms processable by judge and juror. The specifics of
this will vary from discipline to discipline, whether practical or
academic, but in all instances the same question should asked: Has
the proponent of the evidence explained it sufficiently so that it can
be understood and processed rationally?
Should we hold open the possibility that there is some
experiential expertise that may defy easy articulation in the terms I
am proposing here? Chicken sexers, for example, who apparently
can only learn their trade through trial and error and cannot
23
articulate the basis of their decisions? Still, the results of chicken
sexers are verifiable, and thus the reliability of chicken sexers can be
tested.
Similarly, individuals testifying from other forms of
experience will rarely if ever be unique and their testimony can be
systematically compared with opposing views and the like. The
answer to whether there is any form of evidence not subject to this
21
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analysis will have to emerge over time, but my present view is that a
person who cannot explain the basis of testimony in an accessible
fashion or explain how it can be verified ought not be allowed to
testify. This will increase, in some instances remarkably, the difficulty
of securing the admission of some evidence, but allowing testimony
without such a foundation changes the nature of trials from rational
deliberation on the evidence to irrational deference to unjustified
opinions. Modern fact finders are sufficiently enlightened, and
modern courts have adequate tools, to make such deference a thing
of the past and by doing so advance trials as rational, deliberate
events.
Interestingly, the answer to the second part of this inquiry may
resuscitate the global/local distinction, but with a twist. When I say
that it is necessary to establish the “global” issue of reliability, I am
merely saying that virtually all trial testimony will be embedded in or
a part of some larger body of knowledge, and that the reliability of
the testimony will depend in part on the reliability of the inferentially
24
prior propositions or methodologies involved. Still, almost surely no
trial testimony will depend in any direct or critical sense on all
propositions or methods associated with a particular body of
knowledge, and there is little justification for expending trial related
resources to explain to judges and jurors largely irrelevant aspects of
some body of knowledge. In this sense, Professors Risinger and
Moreno are correct again that the Court has directed the trial process
away from a global inquiry into the epistemology of various fields of
knowledge. Still, just as no trial testimony is likely to invoke all
epistemological aspects of a discipline, so too is it unlikely that trial
testimony would ever fail to rely on some aspects of a field’s
epistemology. The task at trial thus can be limited to establishing the
validity of whatever is necessary for the testimony.
What will be necessary for the testimony will in turn be
idiosyncratic to the case. Certain foundational propositions of
various fields will need to be addressed, and why they are accepted as
true established. Some methodological issues will need to be
addressed from time to time, basic statistical methods for example.
The precise contours of the necessary background will depend on the
precise testimony directly relevant to the case that is being proffered.
In this different sense, Kumho Tire did direct a “local” inquiry, but not
one that foregoes the foundations of the bodies of knowledge
24
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relevant to trials. Rather, it directs presentation of the necessary
components of that foundation to the trial judge so that the trial
25
testimony can be understood and processed rationally.
Perhaps this concludes things rather with a whimper than a
bang, for it amounts to saying that trial judges must do whatever
needs to be done in order to ensure that reliable evidence is
presented at trial, but what “needs to be done” cannot be further
specified. I see no alternative to wimping-out on this one, though.
While I laud Professor Risinger’s preliminary efforts to articulate a
taxonomy of expert testimony, I do not think he or anyone else will
succeed in reducing the field to a set of rules containing necessary
and sufficient conditions. The field of potential expertise is vast—
which is precisely why I received this assignment to try to bring order
to it—but sprawling and unpredictable phenomena cannot easily be
26
regulated acceptably by rules. The rules invariably turn out to be
too broad or too narrow. In such instances, there is no substitute for
substantive engagement with the relevant questions—learning
enough about the field to make reasonable judgments, in other
words. In the best Edisonian tradition, more than inspiration, the
27
field of expert testimony calls for good old fashioned perspiration.
The substantive engagement with fields will surely be assisted by
instruction in the forms of knowledge and methodological
approaches, to be sure, and sometimes it will amount to little more
28
than doing individualized validity testing of proffered witnesses.
There is no good reason to attempt to specify in advance what this
might entail, as the great diversity as to what uncontroversially counts
as “science” attests. The criteria for validation in particle physics,
astronomy, and genetics differ markedly, and bear only a fortuitous
or casual relationship to the Daubert criteria, yet all are sciences.
Experiential expertise, beside the point that it should be replicable or
testable in some fashion, will sprawl even more widely over the
25
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28
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horizon (which is the whole point of this inquiry, of course). The
Daubert criteria are useful starting points, but that is all, and they are
being supplemented by the lower courts as the common-law process
works itself out, both with normal science and in other disciplines as
well. Here the adversary system has an important role to play. It is
not the judge’s obligation to engage in his or her own free-standing
romp through the foundations of disciplines but instead to adhere
largely to what the parties produce. The proffering party must
provide enough to establish the foundations of expert testimony, in
29
the light of any contrary evidence produced by the opponent.
One last point. There is considerable consternation in some
areas of the academy today over whether the trial courts are holding
expert testimony to too high a hurdle for admission, and largely
making sufficiency holdings in the guise of admissibility holdings.
Unless the educational function is extended beyond the trial judges
to the juries, this is inevitable.
If expert evidence is both
incomprehensible to jurors and insufficient to justify a verdict, it
cannot rationally inform a jury’s deliberations, for deference to it
would be by definition irrational even if it resulted in an accurate
30
outcome. In such cases, submission of the evidence is pointless, for
a verdict based on it would have to be rejected by the trial court. Or
so it is likely to appear to trial courts. This means that the
incremental educational function of interesting but not terribly wellvalidated studies will be unobtainable at trial, a process possibly
29

This is why Professor Moreno’s concern may be misplaced that a “global”
appraisal of fields “seems to distort the admissibility decision by forcing the judge to
focus on a potentially infinite amount of evidence that is probably irrelevant to the
dispute at hand.” Moreno, supra note 2, at 1053.
There is another concern about the adversary system—whether the demands of
the Supreme Court cases will result in litigation-generated funding of research to
create peer reviewed articles that reach the proper conclusion, and so on. The Ninth
Circuit in the Daubert remand opined that litigation-generated evidence should be
viewed skeptically. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th
Cir. 1995). For a general review of the problem, equally skeptical, see William L.
Anderson et al., Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 619 (2001).
30
Consider, for example, Professor Moreno’s argument that
Daubert’s underlying rationale is a sound one . . . [if] . . . the trial judge
is more knowledgeable in assessing complex scientific testimony than is
the average lay juror, and . . . each judge brings to the specific task of
gatekeeping a general attitude or philosophy concerning the level of
scrutiny appropriate for scientific gatekeepers.
Moreno, supra note 2, at 1042 (quoting Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate: The
Evolving Role of the Judiciary in Admitting Scientific Evidence, 83 JUDICATURE 140, 143
(1999)). Even if these conditions are true, if the jury does not understand the
evidence, its effect can be entirely irrational. There is no necessary or even obvious
relationship between judicial gatekeeping and rational outcomes without education.
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evident in the trial (and appellate) judges’ decisions.
The
proponents of looser standards of admissibility have failed to see, I
think, that the solution to this problem is to embrace education with
a vengeance. If the mildly supportive data of, say, the effects of
parlodel, can be understood, the basis for objecting to admission is
removed, and whatever incremental inferential effect the data may
have can occur. Of course, it is a different matter if the reason for
rejecting an educational approach is that a truly educated person
would see that what is being offered is junk. If that is the case,
however, the evidence should not be admitted if the desideratum is
accurate outcomes arrived at rationally and deliberately. If the goal is
something else, like income redistribution, then different
implications flow.
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Bendictin and parlodel are good examples, perhaps.

